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ABSTRACT
Since its inception, Facebook has become an integral part
of the online social community. People rely on Facebook to
make connections with others and build communities. As
a result, it is paramount to protect the integrity of such a
rapidly growing network in a fast and scalable manner. In
this paper, we present our efforts to protect various social
media entities at Facebook from people who try to abuse our
platform. We present a novel Temporal Interaction Embed-
dingS (TIES) model that is designed to capture rogue social
interactions and flag them for further suitable actions. TIES
is a supervised, deep learning, production ready model at
Facebook-scale networks. Prior works on integrity problems
are mostly focused on capturing either only static or cer-
tain dynamic features of social entities. In contrast, TIES
can capture both these variant behaviors in a unified model
owing to the recent strides made in the domains of graph
embedding and deep sequential pattern learning. To show
the real-world impact of TIES, we present a few applications
especially for preventing spread of misinformation, fake ac-
count detection, and reducing ads payment risks in order to
enhance Facebook platform’s integrity.
1. INTRODUCTION
People use online social media such as Facebook to connect
with family and friends, build communities, and share expe-
riences every day. But the rapid growth of social media in
recent years has introduced several challenges. First is the
rise of fake and inauthentic accounts, which pose potential
threats to the safety of online communities. Second is the
rise of threatening and/or disparaging content such as hate-
speech, misinformation, bullying, terrorist propaganda, etc.
These can occur both through authentic as well as inauthen-
tic accounts. In Q1-2019 Facebook has acted on 4 million
and 2.6 million pieces of content for violating hate-speech
and bullying policies, respectively [3; 2]. We broadly refer
to these as social media integrity challenges.
There is a volume of research on fake account detection in
online social media. Graph propagation techniques to detect
spams over user-following graphs have been proposed in [32;
24]. Integro [8] focuses on predicting victims using user-level
features and performs a random walk style algorithm on a
modified graph. There have been other works that focus on
utilizing the graph structure, by clustering and identifying
cohorts of malicious actors that share common IP addresses
and other common networking properties [29; 33; 31]. Re-
searchers in [20] create graphs based on user activities in
order to detect fake engagements. Similarly, hand-designed
features based on activity has been used in [9].
There is also a volume of research on content-based integrity
problems [5; 6]. Natural language processing techniques
have been widely used for hate-speech and cyberbullying
detection [34; 26; 10; 14; 23]. Simple token and character-
level n-grams are included in the feature set by [34; 26; 10].
Word topic distribution using Latent Dirichlet Allocation
has been used by [14] to detect cyberbullying on Instagram.
Alternatively, paragraph embedding for hate-speech detec-
tion was proposed in [23]. Dinakar et al. [17] presented a
knowledge-based approach utilizing domain specific asser-
tions in detecting hate-speech. In [15; 14] authors combine
image and other media features with text, essentially in-
corporating context through multimodal information. User
meta-data such as the violation history, number of profane
words in prior comments, gender, etc. have also been shown
predictive [22; 36]. More recently, deep-learning has been
used to fight child pornography [25], hate-speech [13; 27],
and misinformation [16; 12].
The majority of previous approaches tackling integrity chal-
lenges are static in nature. More specifically, they utilize
engineered user-level, graph, or content features that do not
alter in time. However, entities on social media (accounts,
posts, stories, Groups, Pages, etc.) generate numerous in-
teractions from other entities over time (see Figure 1). For
instance,
• posts get likes, shares, comments, etc. by users, or
• accounts send or reject friend requests, send or block
messages, etc. from other accounts.
These temporal sequences can potentially reveal a lot about
entities to which they belong. The manner in which fake
accounts behave is different from normal accounts. Hateful
posts generate different type of engagements compared to
regular posts. Not only the type but also the target of these
engagements can be informative. For instance, an account
with history of spreading hate or misinformation sharing or
engaging positively with a post can be indicative of a piece
of questionable content.
In this work, we present Temporal Interaction EmbeddingS
(TIES), a supervised deep-learning model for encoding inter-
actions between social media entities for integrity purposes.
As its input, TIES takes a sequence of (source, target, ac-
tion) in addition to miscellaneous source and target features.
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(a) user-user interactions for fake account detection. (b) post-user interactions for hate-speech detection.
Figure 1: Entities on social media interact with each other in numerous ways. Interactions generated by bad entities differ
from normal entities. We can enhance the platform integrity by capturing/encoding these interactions.
It then learns model parameters by minimizing a loss func-
tion over a labeled dataset. Finally, it outputs prediction
scores as well as embedding vectors. There has also been
other works on temporal interaction networks and embed-
dings. Recently and simultaneously to our work, JODIE,
a novel embedding technique to learn joint user and item
embeddings from sequential data, was proposed [18]. While
these authors apply their algorithm to the problem of de-
tecting banned accounts from Wikipedia and Reddit, which
is similar to the problem of fake account detection, their
work is different from ours. For example, they apply two
recurrent neural networks to learn joint user-item embed-
dings based on temporal interaction sequences, while we
just want to learn the embedding for the source entities.
In order to leverage the target entities current state, we also
use pre-existing embeddings or application specific feature
sets which JODIE does not. A notable limitation of JODIE
and other existing approaches is scalability. On Facebook,
we have billions of accounts and trillions of interactions per
day. Therefore, scalability and reasonable computational
costs are of utmost importance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin
in Section 2 with the problem formulation and description
of the model architecture. In Section 3, we discuss a couple
of integrity case studies and results. Finally, we conclude
the paper with discussions in Section 4.
2. PROTECTINGFACEBOOKSOCIALME-
DIA INTEGRITY
We first start by providing a mathematical formulation for
solving various social media integrity problems encountered
on Facebook’s platform and subsequently present the TIES
model in detail.
2.1 Integrity Problem Formulation
At Facebook, we are interested in verifying the integrity of
various social media entities such as accounts, posts, Pages,
Groups, etc. As mentioned earlier, in this work we exploit
the interaction information between such entities to deter-
mine their integrity. We refer to an entity under inspec-
tion as source (denoted by u) while other interacted en-
tities are referred as targets (denoted by v). Suppose at
time t, the source entity u interacts with target entity vt
by taking an action1 at such as receiving a friend request,
sending an event invite, or liking a post. We might also
have source and target specific features ft at each times-
tamp (e.g. text or image related features or time gaps
between consecutive actions). As a result, we will have
a sequence of temporal interactions represented by I =
{(u, v1, a1, f1), (u, v2, a2, f2), . . . , (u, vT , aT , fT )}. Based on
the interaction sequence I, TIES determines the integrity
of u, for instance, how likely is the entity to be a fake ac-
count or a hateful post. We do so by training a supervised
model using a labeled training set {(Ik, lk)}Nk=1, where lk is
the ground truth label for the sequence Ik. Thus, in our
framework solving social media integrity is formulated as a
sequential or temporal learning problem.
2.2 TIES Model
At the core of the TIES model, there are two types of em-
beddings: 1) graph based and 2) temporal based. These
embeddings are constantly trained to capture the ongoing
behavior of the entities. We first make use of a large-scale
Facebook graph to capture the static behavior of the enti-
ties. Subsequently, these graph-based embeddings are used
to initialize the temporal model that captures the dynamic
behavior of the entities. This is a distinguishing feature of
the TIES that has not been explored before in prior integrity
works. We now describe these parts in more detail.
2.2.1 Graph Based Embeddings
One of the novel components of TIES model is making use
of a large scale graph structure formed by various social
media entities beside the dynamic interaction information.
In social networks, entities may be connected to each other
through friend relationships or belong to the same groups.
Such prior knowledge can capture the ‘static’ nature of var-
ious entities. It should be noted that even though these
static relations (such as friend relationships, group member-
ship, etc.) are not truly static, they vary at a much lower
pace compared to other more ‘dynamic’ interactions (such
1Actions could originate from either source or target.
Figure 2: Facebook social media entity graph. To capture
the static behavior of entities, Pytorch-BigGraph system
is used to compute graph embeddings. These vectors are
treated as pre-trained embeddings for the TIES model.
as post reactions, commenting, etc.). Past studies mainly fo-
cus either on static or dynamic behavior but do not account
for both in the model. Moreover, the scale of the graph
structure considered in this work is much greater than in
previous works and thus presents unique challenges.
Let G = (V,R,E) denote a large-scale multi-relations graph
formed by social media entities (see Figure 2). Here, V
denotes a set of nodes (i.e., entities), R is a set of relations
and E denotes a set of edges. Each edge e = (s, r, d) consists
of a source s, a relation r, and a destination d, where s, d ∈ V
and r ∈ R. In order to learn graph embeddings for entities in
the graph G, we utilize the PyTorch-BigGraph (PBG) [19]
distributed system due to its scalability to billions of nodes
and trillions of edges. This is essential for solving our real-
world needs.
Suppose θs, θr, θd are trainable parameter vectors (embed-
dings) associated with source, relation, and destination. PBG
assigns a score function f(θs, θr, θd) to each triplet, where
higher values are expected for (s, r, d) ∈ E as opposed to
(s, r, d) /∈ E. PBG optimizes a margin-based ranking loss
(shown below) for each edge e in the training data. A set
of judiciously constructed negative edges e′ are obtained by
corrupting e with either a sampled source or destination
node
` =
∑
e∈G
∑
e′∈S′e
max{f(e)− f(e′) + λ, 0}
Here λ is the margin hyperparameter and S
′
e = {(s′, r, d)|s′ ∈
V } ∪ {(s, r, d′)|d′ ∈ V }. Finally, entity embeddings and
relation parameters are learned by performing mini-batch
stochastic gradient descent. More details about these em-
beddings can be found in [19]. The PBG-trained embed-
dings on a large-scale graph with billions of nodes and tril-
lions of edges are fed as pre-trained source and target em-
beddings to the temporal model, to which we now turn.
2.2.2 Temporal Based Embeddings
Temporal based embeddings are designed to capture the in-
formation encoded in the sequence of interactions I as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. Consider all the interactions of a
source entity u in a given window of time period. Suppose
at t time, source entity u interacted with target entity vt by
performing an action at. This whole interaction at time t is
encoded into a single feature vector as follows (see Figure 3):
1. Action Features: Action a, for instance comment-
ing or liking, is represented by a fixed size vector that
will be learned during the training process and initial-
ized as random (also referred as trainable embedding).
Depending upon the task, the same type of action
can learn different embeddings and can have multiple
meanings based on the context. As mentioned earlier,
one can also encode the direction information in action
by splitting it into two directional events as a−send or
a−receive.
2. Source Entity Features: Source entity u is repre-
sented by a pre-trained embedding. More specifically,
we utilize graph-based embeddings obtained from the
PBG system as described in Section 2.2.1. One can
further finetune the pre-trained embeddings in the TIES
model, but this is only possible if the number of unique
source entities is not greater than a few million (due
to computational cost).
3. Target Entity Features: Similar to the source en-
tity, the target entity v is also represented by a pre-
trained embedding (if available) or by a trainable em-
bedding (if problem dimension allows i.e., limited to
few millions). Multiple types of pre-trained target em-
beddings can be utilized in the same TIES model.
4. Miscellaneous features: We can also encode useful
time-related information such as rate of interaction via
∆t = ti+1 − ti (may need to normalize the range ap-
propriately). Rate of interaction is an important signal
for detecting abusiveness. Other features like text or
images can also be plugged into TIES in similar man-
ner.
All these features are packaged into a single feature vector
by performing an aggregation operation. We obtain a single
embedding capturing the full interaction information in
xt = e(u) e(vt) · · · ∆t,
where  is a aggregation operator, e(·) represents the entity
embedding and xt is the resultant embedding obatined at
time t. In our case, we simply choose concatenation as the
aggregation operation. Next, we pass the sequence of these
temporal embeddings i.e., X = [x1,x2, ...,xT ] ∈ RT×d where
T is sequence length and d is the input dimension, into a
sequence encoder to yield TIES embedding z ∈ Rh as follows
z = TIESEncoder(X).
TIES Encoder: It yields our final TIES embedding by
capturing the temporal aspect present in the sequence of
interaction embeddings. Our general purpose sequence en-
coder has the following components:
Figure 3: TIES Model Architecture: At each time step, the (source, target, action) triplet is converted into a feature vector
that consists of trainable action embeddings, pre-trained source and target embeddings, and other miscellaneous features.
The feature vectors are then fed into a deep sequential learning model to capture the dynamic behavior of entities.
1. Sequence Encoding Layer: This encoding layer trans-
forms the input into a hidden state that is now aware
of the interaction context in the sequence
H = SeqEnocder(X).
Here, H ∈ RT×h is the hidden-state matrix with h as
the dimension. We consider three types of sequence
encoding layer in our TIES framework with varying
training and inference costs and benefits:
(a) Recurrent neural networks: RNNs such as
long short term memory networks (LSTM) are
quite capable of capturing dependencies in a se-
quence [35]. But they are inherently slow to train.
(b) Convolutional neural networks: 1D sequence
CNNs can also capture sequential information but
are limited to local context and need to have higher
depth for capturing global context, depending on
the task in hand [7].
(c) DeepSet: When inputs are treated as sets and
their order does not matter, we can use Deepsets
as sequence encoders [21]. Here, we first pass each
input in a sequence through an MLP (small neu-
ral network) and then perform a sum operation
followed by another MLP layer, yielding a single
embedding layer.
Besides the application in-hand and deployment chal-
lenges, the choice among RNN, CNN and DeepSet de-
pends on the tradeoff between performance and infer-
ence time. Due to its recurrent nature, RNN is ex-
pensive while DeepSet has the lowest inference time in
production.
2. Attention Layer: Attention Layer [30] can be used
to weigh the embeddings differently according to their
contribution towards specific tasks. Attention values
can also be used to visualize which part of the inter-
action sequence is being focused more than the others
and that can provide more interpretable outcome. The
output is given by
Z = Attention(H),
where Z ∈ RT×h is the attention layer output.
3. Pooling Layer: A final pooling layer such as mean,
max, or sum operation is used to yield a single em-
bedding for the whole interaction sequence. Here, we
have
z = Pooling(Z)
where z ∈ Rh is the output of the pooling layer and
serves as the final TIES embeddings.
2.2.3 Loss Function
Parameters of TIES are learned based on the task labels
associated with each training sequence Ik, k = 1, 2, ..., N .
For instance, in case of abusive account detection we have
a training set of sequences labeled as either abusive or be-
nign and binary cross-entropy can be considered as the loss
function. In general, TIES embedding z is fed to the feed-
forward neural network for learning the parameters in end-
to-end fashion as follows,
` =
N∑
i=1
L(Xi, f(zi))
where ` is the overall task loss, L is the loss function, f(·)
is the feed-forward neural network, Xi ∈ RT×d is the ith in-
put training sequence, zi ∈ Rh is the corresponding learned
TIES embedding and N is the total number of training sam-
ples. Depending upon the task, different metrics are taken
into consideration and class-imbalance issue is handled by
weighting the classes properly. This completes the overall
description of the TIES model architecture.
3. FACEBOOKINTEGRITYAPPLICATIONS
AND RESULTS
In this section, we briefly describe our implementation of
TIES, introduce some of its integrity applications, and use
cases. These applications cover a wide range of issues from
content-based to account-based.
3.1 Production Implementation
Our framework is built on PyTorch, more specifically Torch-
Script to streamline productionization [4]. Training is gen-
erally performed on GPUs and when needed we use Dis-
tributedDataParallel provided by PyTorch for multi-GPU
training. Inference on the other hand is performed in paral-
lel on up to 200 machines (CPUs suffice during inference).
To maintain relative consistency in embedding vectors over-
time, we use warm-start—that is, initializing the model with
a previously trained one. For our experiments, we use Adam
optimizer with learning rate 0.0005 and clip gradients at 1.
To mitigate overfitting we use dropout with probability 0.1.
Finally, we weight positive samples such that the datasets
are balanced.
3.2 Preventing Spread of Misinformation
False news can spread rapidly, either intentionally or unin-
tentionally, by various actors. Therefore, proactive identi-
fication of misinformation posts is a particularly important
issue. It is also very challenging as some of such posts con-
tain material that are not demonstrably false but rather are
designed to be misleading and/or reflecting only one side of
a story.
Some of the existing techniques train classifiers on carefully
crafted features [28]. There are also approaches that de-
tects “rumors” based on users’ reactions to microblogs over-
time [16; 12]. To the best of our knowledge, users’ histories
(captured via graph-embeddings described in 2.2) and their
interactions with posts have not been used to detect mis-
information systematically. More recently, researchers at
Facebook have devised a multimodal technique for identify-
ing misinformation, inspired by the work of Kiela et al. [11].
In the multimodal model, separate encoders are learned for
various content modalities such as image, post-text, image-
embedded-text, comments, etc. The encoded features are
then collected into a set and pooled in an order-invariant
way. Finally, the pooled vector is passed through a fully
connected layer to generate predictions.
In the context of TIES, we have posts (sources) interacting
with users (targets). Here, we consider a small set of in-
teractions: like, love, sad, wow, anger, haha, comment, and
Figure 4: 2-dimensional TSNE projection of the TIES em-
beddings for misinformation. Clearly, the misinformation
posts (yellow) have a different distribution than the regular
posts (purple).
Model PR-AUC Median Gap ± MAD
TIES-CNN -0.1130 ± 0.0110
TIES-RNN -0.0987 ± 0.0143
TIES-Deepset -0.1152 ± 0.0124
Content+TIES-CNN 0.0386 ± 0.0087
Content+TIES-RNN 0.0474 ± 0.0102
Content+TIES-Deepset 0.0436 ± 0.0087
Table 1: Median Precision-Recall area under the curve dif-
ference with respect to the content-only model and median
absolute deviation on the test dataset for misinformation
detection. Combining TIES with content improves the per-
formance significantly.
share. Moreover, we use embeddings described in Section 2.2
for source and target entities. For this experiment, we split
our training dataset, consisting of 130K posts (roughly 10%
of which are labeled as misinformation), into train-1, train-
2, and test sets2. It should be noted that this dataset is
sampled differently for positive and negative cases and does
not reflect the accurate distribution of the posts on our plat-
form. We then use the set train-1 to train a few TIES mod-
els (CNN, RNN, and Deepset). For all models, we set the
interaction embeddings as well as hidden dimensions to 64.
We consider sequences of length 512, where longer sequences
are cropped from the beginning and shorter sequences are
padded accordingly. The CNN model consists of 2 con-
volution layers of width 5 and stride 1. The RNN model
consists of a 1-layer bidirectional LSTM. And finally, the
Deepset model consists of pre and post aggregation MLPs
with one hidden layer of size 64. In addition to TIES, we
train a multimodal model using post images and texts. Fi-
nally, we use the train-2 dataset to train a hybrid model, a
simple logistic-regression with two features, TIES-score and
multimodal-score. In order to specify confidence intervals,
we run the aforementioned experiment on several train/test
data split. Table 1 illustrates the difference/delta perfor-
mance for various models with respect to the content-only
2We use two disjoint training sets to prevent overfitting.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Sample misinformation posts, as identified by in-
dependent human reviewers, with low content-only but high
hybrid score.
model on the test dataset.
At this point a few observations are worth highlighting:
First, TIES-RNN seems to be the best performing TIES
model. Second, Deepset appears to be the least perform-
ing TIES model, perhaps highlighting the importance of
the ordered sequences (as opposed to sets) in identifying
questionable posts. Third, the content-only model seems to
outperform interaction-only models. Finally, combining the
interactions signal with content (hybrid models) improves
the performance significantly.
Figure 4 illustrates the TSNE projection of the post embed-
dings. It should be noted that the final hidden state of the
TIES model is considered the source-entity and in this case
post embeddings. Interestingly, the distribution of the mis-
information posts (yellow dots), in the latent space, is clearly
different from the regular posts (purple dots). Figure 5 il-
lustrates a couple of positive posts that were not identified
by the content-only model but registered high scores in the
hybrid (content+TIES) model.
3.3 DetectingFakeAccounts andEngagements
It is understood that fake-accounts are a potential security
and integrity risk to the online community. Therefore, iden-
tifying and removing them proactively is of utmost impor-
tance. Most existing approaches in detecting fake accounts
revolve around graph propagation [32; 24] or clustering of
malicious actors and/or activities [29; 33; 31; 20]. Fake-
buster [9] trained a model on activity related features. To
the best of our knowledge, sequence of accounts and associ-
ated activities have not been used in fake account detection.
One of the fake engagement baseline models at Facebook is
a multilayer classifier trained on over one thousand carefully
engineered features. These features cover a range of signals
from metadata, activity statistics, among others. In this ex-
periment, we train a few TIES models and combine them
with the output of the baseline classifier in order to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the sequence data. Here, sources
are accounts engaging with various targets. Targets on the
other hand could be other accounts, posts, or pages. As en-
gagements, we consider a set of 44 sentry-level actions that
includes liking a post, following a page, messaging a user,
friending, etc. As source and target features, we use graph-
based embeddings described in Section 2.2 for accounts, as
well as posts and pages creators, where applicable.
Our dataset consists of 2.5M accounts with 80/20 good/bad
(fake) split. It should be emphasized that this dataset is
sampled differently for positive and negative cases and does
not reflect the accurate distribution of fake accounts on our
platform. We randomly divide this dataset into train-1,
train-2, and test sets consisting of 2M, 250K, and 250K ac-
counts, respectively. We then use the set train-1 to train
a few TIES models similar to the previous experiment de-
scribed in Section 3.2. The main difference is that here
the CNN model has 3 convolution layers of width 5 and
stride 1, and the RNN model consists of a 2-layer bidi-
rectional LSTM. Subsequently, we use the train-2 dataset
to train a logistic-regression with two features, TIES-score
and baseline-score. This experiment is repeated on several
train/test splits in order to calculate confidence intervals.
The performance gap between various models and the base-
line on the test dataset are illustrated in Table 2.
Model PR-AUC Median Gap ± MAD
TIES-CNN -0.0566 ± 0.0022
TIES-RNN -0.0521 ± 0.0011
TIES-Deepset -0.0857 ± 0.0017
Baseline+TIES-CNN 0.0090 ± 0.0014
Baseline+TIES-RNN 0.0110 ± 0.0014
Baseline+TIES-Deepset 0.0055 ± 0.0012
Table 2: Median Precision-Recall area under the curve dif-
ference with respect to the baseline model and median ab-
solute deviation on the test dataset for fake engagement
detection. Combining TIES with the baseline improves the
performance.
Our observations are largely consistent with the ones made
in Section 3.2. Namely, TIES-RNN appears to be the best
performing TIES model, baseline outperforms TIES, and as
an additional feature, TIES can provide a boost to the base-
line model. The fact that baseline outperforms TIES is not
surprising, as it includes a lot more information through over
1000 carefully engineered features. Moreover, gains from
TIES appear to be small but they are statistically signifi-
cant and outside the confidence interval. It should also be
noted that, at the scale of Facebook, even a couple of per-
centage points improvement in recall for the same precision
translates into significant number of additional fake accounts
being caught. Figure 6 illustrates the 2-d projection of the
TIES embeddings and as expected the distribution of the
fake accounts (yellow) is quite different from nor mal ac-
counts (purple).
3.4 Reducing Ads Payment Risks
With more than two billion monthly active users, Facebook
enables small- and medium-sized businesses to connect with
a large audience. It allows them to reach out to their target
audiences in an efficient way and grow their businesses as a
result [1].
Some of the integrity issues facing this advertising platform
include fraudulent requests and unpaid service fees or sub-
stantial reversals. Researchers at Facebook have devised
various models to prevent such abuses. These models gener-
ally include thousands of carefully crafted features that cover
a wide range of information sources, such as user metadata,
Figure 6: 2-dimensional TSNE projection of the TIES em-
beddings for fake engagements. Clearly, the fake accounts
(yellow) have a different distribution than the regular ac-
counts (purple).
activity history, etc. In order to test TIES’ viability for iden-
tifying bad accounts that have failed to pay fees, we train a
few models using interaction signals that generally include
details about the account and associated payment trends.
Here, sources are ads accounts, source features are graph-
based embeddings, and targets are generally nulls. We fol-
low the settings in the previous two experiments: we split
our dataset into train-1, train-2, and test sets consisting of
roughly 200K, 10K, and 10K accounts, respectively. The
datasets are sampled such that we have roughly the same
number of bad and good accounts. We then train TIES-
CNN (2 layers of width 5), TIES-RNN (1 layer biLSTM),
and TIES-Deepset (pre and post aggregation MLPs with 1
hidden-layer of size 64) as well as the baseline model on the
set train-1. We then use train-2 dataset to combine baseline
and TIES scores via a simple logistic regression and finally
test the outcome on the test dataset. In order to calcu-
late the confidence intervals, we repeat this experiment on
several random train/test splits. Precision-recall area under
the curve gaps with respect to the baseline model are illus-
trated in Table 3. Figure 7, on the other hand, demonstrates
the 2-d projection of embedding vectors and as expected the
distribution of bad accounts is quite different from normal
accounts.
Model PR-AUC Median Gap ± MAD
TIES-CNN -0.0705 ± 0.0051
TIES-RNN -0.0672 ± 0.0045
TIES-Deepset -0.1135 ± 0.0062
Baseline+TIES-CNN 0.0088 ± 0.0034
Baseline+TIES-RNN 0.0071 ± 0.0043
Baseline+TIES-Deepset 0.0060 ± 0.0043
Table 3: Median Precision-Recall area under the curve gap
with respect to the baseline model as well as the median
absolute deviation on the test dataset for ads payment
risks. Combining TIES with the baseline improves the per-
formance.
TIES models do a decent job in identifying bad accounts
Figure 7: 2-dimensional TSNE projection of the TIES em-
beddings for ads payment risk. Clearly, accounts with
unpaid fees (yellow) have a different distribution than the
regular accounts (purple).
although they are not as predictive as the baseline model.
Moreover, similar to the previous two experiments, RNN
and CNN perform roughly the same and both outperform
Deepset by a wide margin. Finally, combining TIES with
the baseline provides about 1% gain in precision-recall area
under the curve which is statistically significant. It is worth
noting that even a small improvement in recall for the same
precision would translate to a large monetary value in sav-
ings.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided an overview of the temporal in-
teraction embeddings (TIES) framework and demonstrated
its effectiveness in fighting abuse at Facebook. Social me-
dia entities such as accounts, posts, Pages, and Groups in-
teract with each other overtime. The type of interactions
generated by bad entities such as fake accounts and hateful
posts are different from normal entities. TIES, a supervised
deeplearning framework, embeds these interactions. The
embedding vectors in turn can be used to identify bad en-
tities (or improve existing classifiers). The TIES framework
is quite general and can be used by various forms of ac-
count, post, Page, or Group integrity applications. Moving
forward, we plan to continue exploring other applications
of this methodology within Facebook. Moreover, we can
add additional features such as model interpretability, hy-
perparameter optimization, unsupervised learning, etc. to
the framework in order to create a more complete tool.
5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Authors would like to thank He Li, Bolun Wang, Yingyezhe
Jin, Despoina Magka, Austin Reiter, Hamed Firooz, Shaili
Jain for numerous helpful conversations, data preparation,
and experiment setup.
6. REFERENCES
[1] Facebook for small businesses.
https://www.facebook.com/business/success/categories/small-
business. Accessed: 2020-01-02.
[2] Facebook transparency report - bullying and harass-
ment. https://transparency.facebook.com/community-
standards-enforcement#bullying-and-harassment. Ac-
cessed: 2019-10-28.
[3] Facebook transparency report - hate speech.
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-
standards-enforcement#hate-speech. Accessed: 2019-
10-28.
[4] Torchscript documentation.
https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/jit.html. Accessed:
2020-01-03.
[5] M. W. Anna Schmidt. A survey on hate speech detec-
tion using natural language processing. In Proceedings
of the Fifth International Workshop on Natural Lan-
guage Processing for Social Media, pages 1–10, 2017.
[6] K. B. M. L. R. P. Arkaitz Zubiaga, Ahmet Aker. Detec-
tion and resolution of rumours in social media: A sur-
vey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(32), 2018.
[7] U. Z. A. S. Q. Asifullah Khan, Anabia Sohail. A survey
of the recent architectures of deep convolutional neural
networks. ArXiv, abs/1901.06032, 2019.
[8] Y. Boshmaf, D. Logothetis, G. Siganos, J. Ler´ıa,
J. Lorenzo, M. Ripeanu, and K. Beznosov. Integro:
Leveraging victim prediction for robust fake account de-
tection in osns. In NDSS, volume 15, pages 8–11, 2015.
[9] Y.-C. Chen and S. F. Wu. Fakebuster: A robust fake
account detection by activity analysis. In Proceedings of
9th International Symposium on Parallel Architectures,
Algorithms and Programming (PAAP), pages 108–110.
IEEE, 2018.
[10] A. T. Y. M. Y. M. Chikashi Nobata, Joel Tetreault.
Abusive language detection in online user content. In
Proceedings of 25th International World Wide Web
Conference, 2016.
[11] A. J. T. M. Douwe Kiela, Edouard Grave. Efficient
large-scale multi-modal classification. In Proceedings of
the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 5198–5204, 2018.
[12] S. W. L. W. T. T. Feng Yu, Qiang Liu. A convolutional
approach for misinformation identification. In Proceed-
ings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, pages 3901–3907, 2017.
[13] B. Gambck and U. K. Sikdar. Using convolutional neu-
ral networks to classify hate-speech. In Proceedings of
the First Workshop on Abusive Language Online, pages
85–90, 2017.
[14] A. S. S. R. C. G. D. M. C. C. Haoti Zhong, Hao Li.
Content-driven detection of cyberbullying on the in-
stagram social network. In Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI-16), pages 3952–3958, 2016.
[15] R. I. R. R. H. Q. L. S. M. Homa Hosseinmardi, Sab-
rina Arredondo Mattson. Detection of cyberbullying in-
cidents on the instagram social network. Technical re-
port, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2015.
[16] P. M. H. B. K. S. K. B. J. J. K.-F. W. M. C. Jing Ma,
Wei Gao. Detecting rumors from microblogs with re-
current neural networks. In Proceedings of the 25th In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 3818–3824, 2016.
[17] C. H. H. L. Karthik Dinakar, Birago Jones and R. Pi-
card. Common sense reasoning for detection, preven-
tion, and mitigation of cyberbullying. ACM Transac-
tions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 2(3), 2012.
[18] S. Kumar, X. Zhang, and J. Leskovec. Predicting dy-
namic embedding trajectory in temporal interaction
networks. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery &
Data Mining, pages 1269–1278. ACM, 2019.
[19] A. Lerer, L. Wu, J. Shen, T. Lacroix, L. Wehrst-
edt, A. Bose, and A. Peysakhovich. Pytorch-biggraph:
A large-scale graph embedding system. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1903.12287, 2019.
[20] Y. Li, O. Martinez, X. Chen, Y. Li, and J. E. Hopcroft.
In a world that counts: Clustering and detecting fake
social engagement at scale. In Proceedings of the 25th
International Conference on World Wide Web, pages
111–120. International World Wide Web Conferences
Steering Committee, 2016.
[21] S. R. B. P. R. S. A. J. S. Manzil Zaheer, Satwik Kottur.
Deep sets. In Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing (NIPS), 2017.
[22] R. O. Maral Dadvar, Dolf Trieschnigg and F. de Jong.
Improving cyberbullying detection with user context.
In Proceedings of European Conference on Information
Retrieval, pages 693–696, 2013.
[23] R. M. M. G. V. R. N. B. Nemanja Djuric, Jing Zhou.
Hate speech detection with comment embeddings. In
Proceedings of 24th International World Wide Web
Conference, pages 29–30, 2015.
[24] S. Nilizadeh, F. Labre`che, A. Sedighian, A. Zand,
J. Fernandez, C. Kruegel, G. Stringhini, and G. Vigna.
Poised: Spotting twitter spam off the beaten paths. In
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 1159–
1174. ACM, 2017.
[25] M. P. A. R. Paulo Vitorino, Sandra Avila. Leveraging
deep neural networks to fight child pornography in the
age of social media. Journal of Visual Communication
and Image Representation, 50:303–313, 2018.
[26] M. L. W. Pete Burnap. Us and them: identifying cyber
hate on twitter across multiple protected characteris-
tics. EPJ Data Science, 5(11), 2016.
[27] M. G. V. V. Pinkesh Badjatiya, Shashank Gupta. Deep
learning for hate speech detection in tweets. In Pro-
ceedings of the 26th International Conference on World
Wide Web Companion, pages 759–760, 2017.
[28] M. T. D. Sardar Hamidian. Rumor identification and
belief investigation on twitter. In Proceedings of the
7th Workshop on Computational Approaches to Subjec-
tivity, Sentiment and Social Media Analysis, page 38,
2016.
[29] G. Stringhini, P. Mourlanne, G. Jacob, M. Egele,
C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. {EVILCOHORT}: De-
tecting communities of malicious accounts on on-
line services. In 24th {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 15), pages 563–578, 2015.
[30] A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit,
L. Jones, A. N. Gomez,  L. Kaiser, and I. Polosukhin.
Attention is all you need. In Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, pages 5998–6008, 2017.
[31] C. Xiao, D. M. Freeman, and T. Hwa. Detecting clus-
ters of fake accounts in online social networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 8th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intel-
ligence and Security, pages 91–101. ACM, 2015.
[32] C. Yang, R. Harkreader, J. Zhang, S. Shin, and G. Gu.
Analyzing spammers’ social networks for fun and profit:
a case study of cyber criminal ecosystem on twitter.
In Proceedings of the 21st international conference on
World Wide Web, pages 71–80. ACM, 2012.
[33] F. Y. Q. K. Y. Y. Y. C. Yao Zhao, Yinglian Xie and
E. Gillum. Botgraph: Large scale spamming botnet de-
tection. In 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Sys-
tems Design and Implementation, 2009.
[34] S. Z. H. X. Ying Chen, Yilu Zhou. Detecting offensive
language in social media to protect adolescent online
safety. In 2012 International Conference on Privacy,
Security, Risk and Trust and 2012 International Con-
fernece on Social Computing. IEEE, 2012.
[35] C. E. Zachary Lipton, John Berkowitz. A critical re-
view of recurrent neural networks for sequence learning.
ArXiv, abs/1506.00019, 2015.
[36] D. H. Zeerak Waseem. Hateful symbols or hateful peo-
ple? predictive features for hate speech detection on
twitter. In Proceedings of the NAACL Student Research
Workshop, page 8893, 2016.
